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ABSTRACT
In the summer of 2005, the United States Supreme Court in Castle Rock v. Gonzales and 
the South African Constitutional Court in N.K. v. Minister of Safety & Security overturned 
decisions from their appellate courts. N.K. drew on the Constitutional Court decision in 
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security.  All three were torts cases involving the duties of 
the police, their accountability to the public, and rights of women to be free from violence, and 
each depended on the respective court’s interpretation of its constitution for resolution.  
This article focuses on the comparison, or rather, the sharp contrast between, the values 
and spirit animating these decisions.  The respective courts’ interpretations of the underlying 
values or spirit of their constitutions either help forge a special relationship between victims and 
the police, thereby altering the existing distribution of entitlement and duties, or they hinder 
those attempts.  The contrast is between a Court that views its Constitution as a progressive 
covenant between the people and its government, which fosters a culture of justification and 
accountability, and a Court that views its Constitution as a charter of negative liberties, and 
which will go to great lengths to conserve the status quo distribution of rights and entitlements.  
One is intent on protecting the vulnerable members of its society and the other is skeptical of 
attempts by the legislature to do so through the creation of new rights and the imposition of new 
duties on the police.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this last term, the highest courts in the U.S. and South Africa, respectively, the United 
States Supreme Court in Castle Rock v. Gonzales1 and the South African Constitutional Court in 
N.K. v. Minister of Safety & Security,2 overturned decisions from their appellate courts, the Tenth 
Circuit,3 and the Supreme Court of Appeals.4 Castle Rock involved the failure of the police to 
enforce a restraining order under a “mandatory enforcement” statute resulting in the death of Ms. 
Gonzales’s three daughters, while N.K. involved the rape of a stranded woman by three on-duty 
uniformed police officers who offered to give her a ride home.  The main legal issues in these 
cases are not directly on point, for in Castle Rock the question was whether Ms. Gonzales could 
establish that she had a property right in the enforcement of the restraining order that was worthy 
of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protection, while the question in N.K. was whether the 
Police Services and the Minister of Safety and Security could be held vicariously liable for the 
1
 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
2
 CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005), at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-image/J-CCT52-04 (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2005). 
3
 Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004).
4
 K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/files/45603/45603.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
3gross dereliction of duty on the part of the officers.  Both cases, however, address the important 
issue of the duties of the police, their accountability to the public, and rights of women to be free
from violence, and/or to be protected from violence by the police.  
N.K. drew on another very important South African constitutional judgment, the case of 
Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security,5 which, like Castle Rock, was a case heard on 
exception.  Carmichele’s facts are perhaps more directly on point, as they involved the failure of 
the police and prosecution to act on behalf of the plaintiff to put evidence before the Court to 
oppose the bail of a dangerous sexual offender, despite numerous pleas by concerned parties, 
resulting in a vicious attack by the offender on Ms. Carmichele.  Here, Castle Rock and 
Carmichele share an important doctrinal issue, the question of whether the duties in question can 
give rise to a right of the plaintiff to expect the police to come to her aid.  Both cases addressed 
the issue of the general duty rule and the exception to that rule, which is created when a special 
relationship is established between the plaintiff or her class and the police.6  All three cases are 
torts cases (or the South African counterpart, namely, delict cases) that depend on the courts’ 
respective interpretations of their constitutions to determine if the plaintiff would be afforded a 
remedy.
This article is not primarily concerned with a comparison of the doctrinal nuances of 
these sets of cases, or of the respective constitutional mechanisms that aided the courts in coming 
5
 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) [hereinafter Carmichele, CC] (applying the Constitution to find that a legal duty may have 
existed on the police and prosecutor and that they may have breached that duty when they recommended the release 
without bail of a Mr. Coetzee without placing before the magistrate any information regarding Coetzee’s previous 
convictions and history of sexual violence where Mr. Coetzee subsequently violently attacked the plaintiff),
available at http://concourt.law.wits.ac.za/files/carmichele/carmichele.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2005), remanded to
2003 (2) SA 656 (C) (Chetty, J.) (finding that the police and prosecution owed the plaintiff a legal duty and had 
failed in carrying out the duty). 
6 See infra Part II, at subsection titled “Forging a special relationship” for further discussion of the rule.
4to their decisions.7  The point is the comparison, or rather, the sharp contrast between the values 
and spirit animating these decisions.  The respective courts’ interpretations of the underlying 
values or spirit of their constitutions either help forge a special relationship between victims and 
the police, thereby altering the existing distribution of entitlement and duties, or they hinder 
those attempts.  The contrast is between a Court that views its Constitution as a progressive 
covenant between the people and its government, which fosters a culture of justification and 
accountability, and a Court that views its Constitution as a charter of negative liberties, and 
which will go to great lengths to conserve the status quo distribution of rights and entitlements.8
One is intent on protecting the vulnerable members of its society and the other is skeptical of 
attempts by the legislature to do so through the creation of new rights. 
Part I provides a brief summary of the Supreme Court decision in Castle Rock, 
highlighting the fact that the Supreme Court went to considerable lengths to undermine the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to the mandatory enforcement of the restraining order, an entitlement that 
she was granted under both state legislation and the court order itself.  The Supreme Court came 
to this result by concluding: that contrary to its plain meaning, the statute could not be 
interpreted as providing mandatory enforcement and instead gave police discretion in deciding 
whether to arrest a violator of a restraining order; that the Court need not certify the question of 
the statute’s interpretation to the Colorado Supreme Court; that the Court need not defer to the 
7
 On one level, these opinions draw on very different constitutional mechanisms for their resolution.  The Castle 
Rock decision is based on the Court’s interpretation of “property” under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while the South African cases rely on provisions of the South African Constitution, which require that 
every development of the common law be in compliance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
Section 39 of Act 104 of 1994 (Act 104 of 1994 referred to as “Final Constitution”).  On another level, it will be 
argued that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Castle Rock also draws on what he holds to be the spirit of the U.S. 
Constitution, although he is less explicit in doing so. 
8
 The Court here privileges this laissez faire view of the Constitution in spite of Justice Holmes’s claim in his dissent 
in Lochner  v. New York that “… a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”  198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
5circuit court decision in the case, notwithstanding a general policy and precedent that it do so in 
issues of state law; and that, notwithstanding the specific requirements and purposes of the 
statute, Ms. Gonzales and other Colorado residents had no right to anything other than the 
general protections of law enforcement accorded to all residents.  The Court goes so far as to 
hold that it is virtually impossible for a state to create legislation that can forge a relationship 
between the police and those with restraining orders that is special enough to rise to the level of a 
property right for the purposes of procedural due process protection.9
The Supreme Court decision was not mandated by the text of the Constitution or the text 
of the Colorado legislation.  Neither was it mandated by the respective drafting history or 
purposes of the texts.  The Supreme Court made a choice to reach down into the Colorado 
legislation and interpret it in such a way as to defeat Ms. Gonzales’s property right and in turn 
her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right.  The Court’s main argument throughout was that 
in spite of the plain language, history and purpose of the legislation, the police still had discretion 
under the statute.  In effect, the Court ignored the actual Colorado legislation and found, almost 
as a matter of constitutional law, that the police have discretion to arbitrarily ignore restraining 
orders.  The Court nowhere articulates a principled justification for doing so.  The largely, 
9
 This is similar to the Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which denied 
standing to plaintiff’s suing under the Endangered Species Act challenging a regulation providing that the United 
States would not comply with the Act outside of the United States.  The Act provided for civil suits to enjoin the 
United States for violation of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).  Nonetheless, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
held that Congress cannot authorize standing for generalized grievances, as the prohibition is based on Article III 
rather than prudential grounds, as had been held in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).  This, in effect, 
precludes Congress from creating or expanding justiciable rights to the preservation of endangered species or to 
create other rights based on generalized harms to the public.  See Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of 
Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).  As will be demonstrated below, the right in 
question in Castle Rock is not of this broad nature, but is for a specific person under specific conditions.  
Nonetheless, the result is similar in that the Court is taking it upon itself to thwart the decision of the elected 
branches to create or extend the rights of the people and to impose duties on the state.  The result is less 
accountability of the executive branch.   
6although not completely,10 unarticulated principle underlying the decision is that the underlying 
property claim was new, and if recognized, it would alter the existing common law distribution 
of entitlements and duties.  It would provide those with restraining orders (primarily women) 
with a right to enforcement, would require that police officers execute their duties, and would 
hold municipalities liable when those rights were denied without due process of law. 
Part II will shift to another world, both geographically and legally, and will address the 
decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Carmichele.  In contrast to the decision in 
Castle Rock, the Court in Carmichele is explicit that it is reading purposefully the Constitution 
and the relevant legislation in question to further the values of Constitution.  Unlike in Castle 
Rock, the Court does not decide the final issue, but remands the case to the trial court to hear the 
case on the merits.  The South African Constitutional Court distinguishes its approach from the 
negative liberties approach of the U.S. by noting that the South African Constitution’s provisions 
point towards a positive duty to prevent harm.11  Finally, unlike the Court in Castle Rock, the 
Court in Carmichele took into consideration the historically vulnerable place of women within 
South African society and South Africa’s international obligations in interpreting both the duties 
of the state and the rights of the plaintiff in the case.  These factors combined with the facts of 
the case to forge the special relationship required to impose a duty on the defendants and to 
establish the legally enforceable rights of the plaintiff.  
10
 There is evidence in the judgment of this premise, .e.g. when Justice Scalia writes, “The creation of a personal 
entitlement to something as vague and novel as enforcement of restraining orders cannot ‘simply go without saying’ 
….Such a right would not, of course, resemble any traditional conception of property.”  125 S. Ct. 2796, 2809 
(2005).
11
 Note, however, that the provisions of the South African Constitution and the South African Police Act are not as 
specific as the Colorado legislation and restraining order in Castle Rock that created the purported property 
entitlement for that specific plaintiff.  Compare infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text with note 136 and 
accompanying text.  Neither is the South African Constitution as clear as the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
clause, along with the § 1983 federal legislation, giving the plaintiff in Castle Rock the cause of action.  Compare 
infra note 12 with note 136 and accompanying text.
7Part III continues with a similar approach to the duties of the police and the rights of 
victims, although in the context of vicarious liability.  The case of N.K. explicitly draws on the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Carmichele, but it also brings out the contrast between a 
conservative, libertarian approach to vicarious liability, which favors minimal responsibility of 
employers, including the state, for the conduct of employees, and the constitutionally inspired 
approach, which favors the safety of the public and accountability of employers and the state, for 
the risks and harms they impose on the public.  N.K., like Carmichele, and unlike Castle Rock, 
fosters a culture of public accountability and a culture of protecting the rights of some of the 
most vulnerable members of its society. On almost every conceivable view of democracy the 
South African decisions and approach are better than the decision and approach taken in Castle 
Rock.
II. CASTLE ROCK
A.  Introduction
Ms. Gonzales sued the City of Castle Rock under 24 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process clause.12  Her claim was that “…she had a property interest 
in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband, and that the town deprived 
her of this property without due process by having a policy that tolerated non-enforcement of 
12
 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).  As the Court explained:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a State shall not 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Amdt. 14, § 1.  In 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, Congress has created a federal cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
Id. at 2802-03.
8restraining orders.”13  The alleged facts, which, given that the case was heard on exception, were 
required to be accepted as true by the Court, were that “her deprivation was not the result of 
random and unauthorized behavior by the individual officers.  Rather, . . . the deprivation was 
the result of a custom and policy of the City of Castle Rock not to enforce domestic abuse 
protective orders.”14  Her claim was one of reckless disregard for her right to police protection,15
which took place “… when its police officers… failed to respond properly to her repeated reports 
that her estranged husband was violating the terms of a restraining order.”16  This failure by the 
police resulted in her estranged husband killing their three daughters and driving with their 
bodies in the cab of his pickup truck to the police station where he open fired on the police, who 
returned fire, killing him.17
Her claim to a property right was based on the Colorado legislation combined with the 
actual restraining order.  In 1994 Colorado joined a wave of states that enacted legislation to 
address this very problem:18 the problem of death and injury to victims of domestic violence 
caused in part by the custom of police to avoid the enforcement of restraining orders.19  The 
13 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803.  As the circuit court noted, “Indeed, the process would only take minutes to 
perform, and includes tasks officers regularly perform in the course of their daily duties.”  Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 
366 F.3d 1093, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004).
14 Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1112-13. 
15 Id. at 1113 (quoting Aplt. Appx. at 12). 
16 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800.
17 Id. at 2802.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, begins the opinion by acknowledging the horrible facts in the 
case.  Id. at 2800.
18
 Justice Stevens notes that nineteen states mandate arrest for domestic restraining order violations.  Castle Rock, 
125 S. Ct. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  G. Kristian Miccio puts the number at twenty-nine in A House Divided: 
Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 237 n.2 (2005).  I would add six other jurisdictions to her list, for a total of thirty-five U.S. states and 
territories.  See Christopher Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, the Court’s Assault on New Property: The 
Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order is “a Sham, Nullity and Cruel Deception,” Appendix A 
(forthcoming [note I presently have two offers to publish this article and will make a final determination by the 9th of 
September] ).
19
 One of the most important factors leading to the development of mandatory arrest laws has been the consistent 
dismissive attitude that police have displayed toward domestic violence.  Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A 
Step Toward Eradication of Domestic Violence But is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 542 (1996).  Almost 
every state now allows police officers to make an arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to 
believe that domestic violence has occurred.  Id. at 542.  "However, police officers have made little use of their 
9Colorado General Assembly passed legislation targeting domestic violence in general,20 and the 
mandatory enforcement of restraining orders in particular.  Section 18-6-803.5. of the Colorado 
Revised Statutes Annotated (“Crime of violation of a protection order--penalty--peace officers' 
duties”) states, “... A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection 
order,”21 and further clarifies the duty by stating: 
A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the 
circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace 
officer has information amounting to probable cause that:
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a 
protection order; and
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the protection 
order or the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and 
substance of such order.22
The statute not only identifies the police as having a duty to enforce the protection order, 
but also identifies the beneficiary of the order.  Subsection (1)(a) identifies the “protected 
person” as “…the person or persons identified in the protection order as the person or persons for 
whose benefit the protection order was issued.”
After briefly addressing the “special relationship” created by the statute and Ms. 
Gonzales’s “new property” right, this section will address the Court’s flawed approach to the 
case and then the Court’s flawed arguments in the case.  Had the case of Castle Rock been 
approached according to accepted canons of statutory construction and precedent, it either would 
expanded arrest power ... even when probable cause is clearly present, police officers frequently try to calm the 
parties and act as mediators."  Id.  Further, Wanless refers to three studies that have shown that arrest records are 
very poor when there are no policies or laws mandating arrest.  Id.  These studies found that when the decision was 
left to the police the arrest rate ranged between three percent and ten percent.  Id.  In one of the studies police made 
arrests in only thirteen percent of the cases where the victim had visible injuries and in only fourteen percent of the 
cases where the victim requested an arrest.  Id. at 542-43.  Another study put the latter figure at thirty-nine percent.  
Id. at 543.  The more fundamental reason for the laws is the tragic numbers of deaths and injuries to women and 
children (see, e.g., The American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence statistics on women and 
children, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2005)), which were due in part to the 
ineffectiveness of prior forms of intervention and to the dismissive attitudes of the police.  Wanless, supra, at 540-
42.
20 See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).
22 Id. at § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (emphasis added).
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have been certified to the Colorado Supreme Court for a determination of the issue of the state-
based right, or it would have been remanded for a trial on the merits.  Secondly, even if one 
accepts the Court’s approach to the case, not certifying the question and not deferring to the 
circuit court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s arguments defeating Ms. Gonzales’s claims are 
seriously flawed.  The decision can only be justified by a strong presumption against the ability 
of states to create new property rights that will be protected against arbitrary deprivation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause.    
1)  Forging a special relationship
In effect, the Colorado General Assembly forged a “special relationship” between the 
police and those who have obtained restraining orders, creating duties on the police to enforce 
restraining orders, and the right or entitlement of those who have obtained orders to have them
enforced.  This altered the common law distribution of entitlements and duties, for under the 
common law the police have no duty to come to one’s aid unless there is this “special 
relationship.”23  The public duty rule works to defeat claims by specific individuals absent a 
“special relationship” establishing a specific duty to the plaintiff or her class.24  Traditionally, 
“special relationships” are limited to those cases in which the police have committed to taking 
action on behalf of the particular plaintiff,25 or those in her class,26 or when a statute imposes a 
23 See, e.g.,  Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure 
to Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R. 5th 273 (2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A,  
323 (1965).
24
 The public duty doctrine extends beyond police duties to all public entities.  Exceptions can be found when the 
conduct in question is not merely negligent but reckless, intentional or egregious, or when the entity induces reliance 
by the plaintiff, stands in a special relationship to either the wrongdoer or the victim, and when the entity is guilty of 
a misfeasance (negligent action), rather than a nonfeasance (negligent omission).  See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 271, at 723-27 (2000).  Dobbs refers to recent case law in a few states that have rejected the public duty 
doctrine, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin.  Id. at 725-26 n.23.  In many of these cases the courts noted that the public duty rule was a form of 
immunity and thus should not survive when immunity has been abrogated.  Id.
25
 “…[W]hen the State, through its agents, voluntarily assumes a protective duty toward a particular member of the 
public, and undertakes action on behalf of that individual, reliance is induced and the State is held to the same 
standard of care as a private person or organization.”  Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 140 (Cal. 1983).  See, e.g., 
11
specific duty on the entity for a particular class of persons.27  This is what the Colorado 
legislation did.  The legislation and the court order were designed to make it clear to the police 
that in addition to their general public duties that they have specific duties to a certain class of 
individuals covered by the legislation and to the particular person specified in the court order.28
The idea was to forge a special relationship with a class of people that the police had wanted to 
avoid,29 thus providing a right to enforcement and bringing an end to an era of arbitrary 
enforcement.  
2) Ms. Gonzales’s property right
Yet, last term the U.S. Supreme Court essentially rewrote the Colorado law and undid its 
protections by removing any prospect for a constitutional remedy for those directly harmed by 
police officers’ arbitrary decision to violate the law by not enforcing restraining orders.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that Ms. Gonzales could not state a claim for which relief could be granted 
Morgan v. County of Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (where police failed to keep their voluntary 
promise to inform plaintiff’s wife of the release of a prisoner who had threatened to kill her and when released did 
kill her).  The rule has been characterized as an application of the “good Samaritan” rule that attaches once one 
volunteers to assist.  See Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 900 (Cal. 1982).  Note, however, that the 
argument for holding the police liable under such conditions is stronger given that they have a general duty to the 
public while the average citizen who volunteers aid does not.
26
 Florence v. Goldberg, 375 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1978) (the police department voluntarily assumed the specific duty 
to guard a school crossing and without notice failed in that duty).
27 DOBBS, supra note 24, at 724.   
28 Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104.  The circuit court made the following remark about the conduct of the police in this 
case: “Their response, in other words, was a sham which rendered her property interest in the restraining order not 
only a nullity, but a cruel deception.”  Id. at 1117.  As noted by the circuit court, the property right held by this 
particular plaintiff was not created by the abstract legislative process which brought the legislation into being, but by 
the order “issued by a court on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific individuals and the police.” Id.
at 1104.
29
 As Heather Melton states, “Historically, police response has been severely limited and confined to a policy under 
which officers ended up chronically distancing themselves from a task they felt did not belong under their 
jurisdiction.”  Heather C. Melton, Police Response to Domestic Violence, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 1, 1 
(1999), available at http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/CJreadings/PoliceDomesticViolence.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2005).  The reasons for the avoidance include sexist views, the view that these are purely private matters, 
the resistance the police encounter from perpetrators and victims, the danger for the police responding to domestic 
calls, and the fact that the police they are often ill- equipped to mediate or counsel perpetrators and victims.  See, 
e.g., Melton, supra, at 3.  An influential study in Minneapolis indicated that arrests were more effective at 
addressing the problem.  Melton, supra, at 2.  Marion Wanless argues that mandatory arrest statutes aid the police as 
they take the domestic violence scenario out of the quasi police function of mediation and put it squarely into the 
arrest function, which police are better trained to perform and more comfortable performing.  Wanless, supra note 
19, at 547.
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because she had no “property right” to have the court order enforced, notwithstanding that the 
legislature had required that such enforcement was mandatory in all cases. Thus, not only did the 
police arbitrarily deny her protection, The Supreme Court denied her the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.30
Although the property right in this case is not the typical right to have government not 
take one’s land, the distinction between rights and mere privileges was rejected in Goldberg v. 
Kelly,31 and this was solidified in Roth v. Board of Regents,32 where the Court stated, “the Court 
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once 
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.”33  In Roth the Court 
basically set up two sides to the test.  As to the first side, the Court stated: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 
abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral expectation of 
it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.  It is a purpose of 
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely 
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.34
30
 Note that the quote at the beginning of this article is from the House of Representative debates over the Civil 
Rights bill introduced in 1866, passed and vetoed by President Johnson and then overridden in that same year.  See
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 423-54 (2d ed. 2005).  The 
Civil Rights Act was the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment.  The argument put forward by representative 
Broomall included pointing out that it was “strange” that the government had the power to protect U.S. citizens 
abroad, but was powerless to protect them from the discriminatory denial of rights within the U.S. by the various 
states.  See id at 430-31.  If the government is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, how can it ask for their 
allegiance?
31
 397 U.S. 254 (1970).  As Charles R. Reich has commented about the case: 
The question is: how much responsibility should the community take for the protection of the 
individual?  The community must choose among three responses.  It can deny social responsibility 
entirely.  It can make economic protection of the individual a goal, but balance this goal against 
other goals which may be given an equal or higher priority.  Or the community can make 
individual security an absolute right.  Goldberg v. Kelly took the middle ground.  It was a modest, 
moderate decision giving procedural protection to welfare recipients.
Charles R. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological view of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 731 
(1990).
32
 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
33 Id. at 571.
34 Id. at 577.
13
The other side of the test is whether the State has created the entitlement, i.e., the 
existence of an entitlement is determined by an “independent source such as state law” and the 
“rules or understandings” that it creates.35
The majority in Castle Rock began its analysis by quoting much of this language from 
Roth.36  It did not spend any time on the first side of the question, most likely because the answer 
to it provides strong support for the existence of an entitlement.  Rather, the Court turned to the 
second side of the test to determine if in fact the State had created such an entitlement.   
But, before doing so, the Court addressed a few preliminary matters, which if dealt with 
properly should have resulted in the case either being remanded for a decision on the merits or 
being certified to the Colorado Supreme Court for a determination on the issue of the state-based 
property right.  This did not take place, however, because the Court refused to certify the 
question to the Colorado Supreme Court so it could decide whether its “mandatory arrest” 
statute, along with the court order, create the state right or entitlement in issue; and finally, it 
refused to defer to the decision of the six judge panel of the Tenth Circuit, although deference is 
the general rule in cases involving state law questions.37
B. The Court’s approach to the case
Although the Supreme Court made the central question in this case the state law question 
regarding the establishment of an entitlement in favor of Ms. Gonzales,38 the majority of the 
35 Id.  Charles Reich is generally credited with being the driving intellectual force behind the assault on the right 
privilege distinction and for the recognition of “new property” rights.  See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).  Reich’s list of “new property” includes: income and benefits, jobs, occupational licenses, 
franchises, contracts, subsidies, public resources, and services, include postal service, police and fire services and 
education among others.  Id. at 733-37.  The issue of the property right in question is addressed infra, throughout 
Part III.
36 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803. 
37 See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
38
 Justice Scalia may be thinking that the real issue in the case is a federal issue when he concludes, near the end of 
his decision, that “[t]his result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as 'a font of tort 
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Supreme Court did not find it prudent to certify the question to the Colorado Supreme Court.  
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, put forth a strong array of arguments in favor of sua sponte 
certification of the question, including “…federal-state comity, constitutional avoidance, judicial 
efficiency, and the desire to settle correctly a recurring issue of state law.”39  The Court rejected 
the idea that it should certify the case on the basis that the parties did not desire to have the 
question certified.40
Even if the Court did not find Justice Stevens’s arguments persuasive, it still would have 
been the practice to defer to the circuit court’s determination as to the matter of state law, absent 
a finding that the decision was “clearly wrong.”41  The reasons for the rule of deference are based 
on both efficiency and local knowledge of law and practice.42  In response to Respondent’s 
contention that the Supreme Court was obliged to give deference to the circuit court, Justice 
law.'  Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (internal citations omitted).  This is an indication of his hostility to the § 1983 
legislation, which explicitly makes violation of the Fourteenth Amendment a font for tort law. 
39 Id. at 2816 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2815-16. 
40 Id. at 2804 n.4.
41
 The Court in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), stated:
The Court has stated that it will defer to lower courts on state-law issues unless there is "plain" 
error, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943); the view of the lower court is "clearly 
wrong," The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 (1959); or the construction is "clearly 
erroneous," United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 527 (1960), or "unreasonable," 
Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1949). On occasion, then, the Court has refused to follow 
the views of a lower federal court on an issue of state law. In Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 
683-84 (1972), e. g., we refused to accept a three-judge District Court's construction of a single 
statutory word based on the dictionary definition of that language where more reliable indicia of 
the legislative intent were available.
Id. at 500 n.9. 
42
 As Stevens states:
[t]his policy is not only efficient, but it reflects “our belief that district courts and courts of appeal 
are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.”  Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500-501, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394, 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985); 
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629-630, 90 L. Ed. 358, 66 S. Ct. 445 (1946) (endorsing 
"great deference to the views of the judges of those courts 'who are familiar with the intricacies 
and trends of local law and practice'").  Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 145, 135 L. Ed. 2d 443, 
116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (per curiam).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2814 (dissenting).
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Scalia flippantly stated, “We will not, of course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate 
issue.”43  His reason is stated as follows: 
We have said that a “presumption of deference [is] given the views of a federal 
court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction.”  Phillips, supra, at 167.  That 
presumption can be overcome, however, see Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 145 
(1996) (per curiam), and we think deference inappropriate here.  The Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion, …did not draw upon a deep well of state-specific expertise, but 
consisted primarily of quoting language from the restraining order, the statutory 
text, and state-legislative hearing transcripts.  See 366 F.3d, at 1103-1109.44
This does not help the Court’s case, as the per curiam decision in Leavitt was based on the 
finding that the circuit court was clearly wrong in failing to give effect to the plain language of 
the statute.45  As with the legislative history of the statute, the Court cannot find any support for 
the view that there is a more permissive standard than the “clearly wrong” standard.  Further, the 
Court does not attempt to argue that the circuit court was clearly wrong, but merely states that 
“we think deference inappropriate here.”46  The Court has both distorted the rule and misapplied 
it to the facts of the present case.
C. The Court’s substantive arguments designed to defeat the claim to a property 
right
Having thus strained to bring the matter under its purview, the Court turned its attention 
to systematically undermine the claim that Ms. Gonzales had a property entitlement in the 
enforcement of the restraining order.  The Court argued that: the alleged mandatory arrest statute 
43 Id. at 2803.
44 Id. at 2804.
45
 As the Court stated, “The Court of Appeals' opinion not only did not regard the explicit language of § 317 as 
determinative -- it did not even use it as the point of departure for addressing the severability question.”  518 U.S. at 
140.  It went on to state, in the section cited by Justice Scalia in Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2804, that the “… general 
presumption [of deference] is obviously inapplicable where the court of appeals' state-law ruling is plainly wrong, a 
conclusion that the dissent does not even contest in this case.”  Id. at 145 (emphasis added).  In Castle Rock, it is 
Justice Scalia who is ignoring the explicit language of the statute, not the circuit court.
46 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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is not mandatory because it still allows for police discretion and thus it cannot give rise to an 
entitlement;47 even if the statute was mandatory, it mandates one of two options: arrest or seek an 
arrest warrant, and since the second option is a procedure and not an end in itself, this cannot 
give rise to an entitlement;48 even if the statute mandated a non-discretionary duty on the part of 
the police, it would still not follow that the intention was to provide the plaintiff a right or 
entitlement, rather than simply fulfilling a public end, as does much of the criminal law;49 and 
even if it did establish an entitlement, it is not a property entitlement protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not have monetary value and was an 
incidental benefit of a general duty.50
The remainder of this section puts for the arguments that: the plain language, history and 
purpose of the legislation all indicate that the statute mandates enforcement, and while their may 
be some amount of discretion, it is not of the sort that undermines the duty of enforcement; the 
options of arrest or seek an arrest warrant are not discretionary options and they are not merely 
procedures, but are ends that give rise to an entitlement; the statute serves both public and private 
ends and the history of the legislation and other similar legislation indicates that that the 
intention was to create a right or entitlement in the mandatory enforcement; and,  because the 
entitlement was created by the democratically elected and accountable representatives of the 
people of Colorado, because it does have monetary value, and because it is central to the purpose 
of the legislation, it is inappropriate for the Supreme Court to unilaterally diminish this 
entitlement to something unworthy of due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.   
47 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806-07.  As will be demonstrated below, it is unclear if the Court is holding that no 
mandatory arrest statute can really be mandatory, or if it is holding merely that this statute’s language fails to be 
clearly mandatory. 
48 Id. at 2807-08.  Justices Souter and Breyer, in their concurring opinion, rest on this argument.
49 Id. at 2808-09.
50 Id. at 2809-10
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1) Duty versus discretion
The first set of arguments by the Court to justify its decision rests on the claim that the 
purported mandatory arrest statute is not mandatory because it allows for discretion.51
According to the Court, “Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if 
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”52  The Court arrived at its 
determination that the statute allowed for discretion by ignoring the plain language of the 
statute,53 and of the restraining order, as well as ignoring the legislative history of the particular 
statute and similar statutes addressing the same issue. 
  The circuit court decision was based on both the plain meaning of the statute and of the 
court order that was issued to Ms. Gonzales because it was “…issued by a court on behalf of a 
particular person and directed at specific individuals and the police.”54  The circuit court pointed 
to the specific language of the court order in this case:
[y]ou shall use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining order." Id. It 
further dictated that an officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical 
under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person 
when you have information amounting to probable cause that the restrained 
person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of this order and the 
restrained person has been properly served with a copy of this order or has 
received actual notice of the existence of this order.55
51 Id. at 2802. 
52 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 
(1989)).
53
 Justice Scalia is known for his textualist approach to interpretation, which in his hands is in keeping with a 
conservative approach to entitlements.  As stated by Bradford C. Mank, “Justice Scalia and other modern textualists 
often use ‘clear-statement canons’ that require express congressional authorization for a particular type of 
government regulatory action; this results in narrow constructions of a statute.  Clear-statement principles are 
specific applications of the common law's traditional presumption in favor of narrowly construing statutes that 
arguably change the law.  Most scholars believe that clear-statement principles generally tend to narrow the scope of 
statutory language.”  Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, 
Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 551 (1997-98).  As will be 
demonstrated infra, in Castle Rock Justice Scalia and the majority avoid the textualist approach here because it 
would require the recognition of new entitlements. 
54 Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1104.
55 Id. at 1103-04.
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This mirrors the language of the statute quoted at the beginning of this section.  While the 
repeated use of the word “shall” is not the same word as the word “mandatory,” few words have 
clearer statutory meaning.56  “You shall” means that you are have a duty to do that which
follows the verb.57  On a plain textualist reading of the statute it is hard to explain what other 
meaning “shall” could have, given that neighboring provisions use the word “may.”58  The 
majority of the Court reads them to mean the same thing,59 but to do so violates a basic canon of 
statutory construction.60  It effectively voids the word “shall” in the text, rendering it 
superfluous.61
56
 “The factor which most heavily weighs in favor of a mandatory construction is the use of the word ‘shall’ in the 
provision at issue.  Unless the context indicates otherwise, the word ‘shall’ generally indicates that the General 
Assembly intended the provision to be mandatory.”  DiMarco v. Department of Revenue, MVD, 857 P.2d 1349, 
1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (citing People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986)).
57 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), reads:
shall, vb. 1. Has a duty to; more broadly, is required to <the requester shall send notice> <notice 
shall be sent>. • This is the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically 
uphold. 2. Should (as often interpreted by courts) <all claimants shall request mediation>. 3. May 
<no person shall enter the building without first signing the roster>. • When a negative word such 
as not or no precedes shall (as in the example in angle brackets), the word shall often means may. 
What is being negated is permission, not a requirement. 4. Will (as a future-tense verb) <the 
corporation shall then have a period of 30 days to object>. 5. Is entitled to <the secretary shall be 
reimbursed for all expenses>. • Only sense 1 is acceptable under strict standards of drafting.
(emphasis added).
58
 For instance, section 18-6-803.5(6)(a) of Colorado Revised Statutes states that “Such peace officer may transport, 
or obtain transportation for, the alleged victim to shelter.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS through 2004 
Supplement (2004 Sess.) (emphasis added).
59
 This immediately brings the question to mind: How does the majority interpret all the “Thou shalts’” in the Ten 
Commandments? 
60
 As the Court stated in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A., “It is, moreover, ‘a cardinal 
principle of statutory construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be 
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’" 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004)
(quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).  
Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-201 (Intentions in the enactment of statutes) states, “(1) In enacting a statute, 
it is presumed that: …(b) The entire statute is intended to be effective.”  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS through 
2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.).
61
 Although ignored by the Court, Colorado legislation provides guidance as to how its provisions are to be read.  
Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-101 (Common and technical usage) reads in part, “Words and phrases shall 
be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
(LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).  “If the language of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, it must 
be applied as written.”  Interest of A.R.W., 903 P.2d 10, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Heagney v. Schneider, 677 
P.2d 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)).
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The Court counters the plain meaning reading with what it refers to as the “well 
established” tradition of discretion that has coexisted with other mandatory arrest statutes in the 
past.62  The Court’s move is to rely on tradition in this area, or the status quo, and although it 
appears to cite authority for its view, none of the authority is relevant to mandatory arrests 
statutes in the specific context of restraining order or protection order violations.  The Court 
refers to both the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice63 and Chicago v. Morales64 to try to argue 
that legislative history65 and precedent show that there is still discretion under mandatory arrest 
statutes.  Yet the ABA standards are not addressed to the legislative history of this particular 
statute, nor to any of the other statutes passed to mandate arrest in the restraining order context.  
Further, the Court in Morales found that there was still discretion, because the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague in specifying the conditions under which an arrest was to be made not 
because the arrest was mandatory.66
62 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806.
63 Justice Scalia quotes from the commentary to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for this view, but the 
language he quotes does not actually further the view.  The reasons he gives for why “mandatory arrest statutes” do 
not mean “mandatory” include “…legislative history, insufficient resources and sheer impossibility.” 125 S. Ct. 
2806 (quoting 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-4.5, commentary, pp. 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)
(footnotes omitted)).  The problem is that the ABA standards are not referring to mandatory arrest for the violation 
of restraining orders, so the legislative history is off point and the reasons of “insufficient resources” or “sheer 
impossibility” do not turn a mandatory requirement into discretionary choice.  They may be justifications for why 
the police are unable to immediately arrest or obtain a warrant, in a given context, but they do not defeat the duty.
Colorado Revised Statutes section 2-4-201 (d) (Intentions in the enactment of statutes) states, “(1) In enacting a 
statute, it is presumed that: …(d) A result feasible of execution is intended.” There is no evidence that it was 
infeasible or impossible to carry out the duties in this case.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS through 2004 
Supplement (2004 Sess.).
64 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
65
 In his scholarly work, Justice Scalia rejects the use of legislative history as a means of determining the meaning of 
a statute, as he states, "My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is 
what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an 
authoritative indication of a statute's meaning."  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
36 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1996).  Justice Scalia further states that ". . . it is simply incompatible with democratic 
government, or indeed even with fair government, to have the meaning of law determined by what the lawgiver 
meant, rather than what the lawgiver promulgated."  Id. at 17.  Is it more democratic to determine the meaning 
according to what the Court thinks the words mean, rather than their plain meaning?
66 Id. at 56-59.
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The legislative history of the Colorado legislation,67 and legislation of its type (i.e., 
mandatory arrest statutes in the restraining order or protection order context, rather than 
mandatory arrest statutes generally) do reinforce the “mandatory” reading of the legislation.68
The majority of the Court cannot point to any evidence that the drafters of the Colorado statute 
meant “may” when they used the term “shall.”  
Thus, there is evidence at the very beginning of the judgment that the Court is stretching 
to justify it interpretation of the text in order to deny the right and enforce the duty.  The Court 
stretches further when it turns to Chicago v. Morales for the proposition that it impossible to 
create a true mandatory arrest statute, for as the Court in Morales stated, it is “’common sense 
that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city 
67
 Scalia notes that the Court of Appeals quoted a lawmaker's description of how the bill ‘would really attack the 
domestic violence problems:’
The entire criminal justice system must act in a consistent manner, which does not now occur. The 
police must make probable cause arrests. The prosecutors must prosecute every case. Judges must 
apply appropriate sentences, and probation officers must monitor their probationers closely. And 
the offender needs to be sentenced to offender-specific therapy.
The entire system must send the same message . . . [that] violence is criminal. And so we hope that 
House Bill 1253 starts us down this road. 366 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Tr. of Colorado House 
Judiciary Hearings on House Bill 1253, Feb. 15, 1994) (emphases omitted).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2805 n.6 (internal quotations omitted).  He does not refer to any contrary authority 
regarding the legislative history of this statute, nor any regarding the host of mandatory arrest statutes in the 
restraining order or protection order context.  Similarly the petitioner could not refer to any evidence of contrary 
intent with regard to mandatory arrest statutes in the context of restraining orders or protection orders.  See 
Petitioner Br. and Petitioner Reply Br.  The Reply Brief, like Justice Scalia’s opinion, addresses other types of 
mandatory arrest statutes. 
68
 The court in Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d. 137 (Or. 1983) addressed the history behind similar Oregon legislation 
when it stated: 
ORS 133.310(3) prescribes that a peace officer "shall arrest and take into custody a person without 
a warrant" when the officer has probable cause to believe that an order under the statute has been 
served and filed and that the person has violated the order. The widespread refusal or failure of 
police officers to remove persons involved in episodes of domestic violence was presented to the 
legislature as the main reason for tightening the law so as to require enforcement of restraining 
orders by mandatory arrest and custody.
Nearing, 670 P.2d at 142.  The court also noted that, like the provisions of the Colorado statute, “Subsection (3) 
appears after two subsections that state when an officer "may" arrest a person without a warrant, and the contrasting
use of "shall" in subsection (3) is no accident.”  Id.  In light of the public nature of the litigation in Castle Rock, it is 
hard to imagine that the drafters of the Colorado statute were ignorant of how the language they chose would be 
interpreted by the courts. 
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ordinances.’” 69  The very next sentence states, “…a true mandate of police action would require 
some stronger indication from the Colorado Legislature than ‘Shall use every reasonable means 
to enforce a restraining order” (or even ‘shall arrest… or seek a warrant’), §§ 18—6—
803.5(3)(a), (b).”70
If this last sentence is the holding, then clearer language may at least convince some 
members of the Court that the state in question intended to create a right to mandatory 
enforcement, but as noted above, it is hard to imagine clearer language.  If the prior sentence is 
the real holding, then no matter how strong the language is, it is not humanly possible to squeeze 
out all of the discretion.  As long as the statute is directed at human beings to carry out a 
function, there will always be some discretion as to exactly when or how a person will carry out 
the function.71  This would defeat almost every entitlement claim that has arisen, be it health 
care, as pointed out by Justice Stevens,72 or any of a number of other entitlements that the courts 
have found to give rise to due process protection,73 for they all involve some level of discretion 
in implementation. 
69 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Morales, 527 U.S. at 62 n.32) (emphasis in Castle Rock).
70 Id.
71
 This is why it is common for the courts to distinguish between different types of discretion.  As the circuit court 
noted: 
In Allen, the Supreme Court noted one could use the term "discretion" in two distinct ways.  “In 
one sense of the word, an official has discretion when he or she 'is simply not bound by standards 
set by the authority in question.'" Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375, 107 S. Ct. 2415 
(1987) (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 1996) 
(1977)). In the alternative, "the term discretion may instead signify that 'an official must use 
judgment in applying the standards set him [or her] by authority.' " Id. (citing DWORKIN, supra
at 31, 32). See also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir.1988). 
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105-06. At best the discretion here is in how to carry out the policy or instructions set down 
for the officer, and not the discretion to ignore the policy or to set new policy. 
72 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73 E.g. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (continued public employment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 574 (1975) (free education); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp, 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (garnished wages); 
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (professional licenses); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (drivers’ licenses), 539 
(1971); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (causes of action); Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (the receipt of government services, including utility services); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (disability benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare 
benefits).
22
Given that a majority of the Court would not be inclined to deny all of these entitlements, 
then the question shifts back to what kind of discretion is appropriate.  This may depend on the 
nature of the endeavor, for some endeavors require less by way of exercising judgment or 
discretion.  In the case of police enforcement, it would not be wise for the State to require that, 
no matter what, an officer be required to drop everything immediately and arrest or hunt down 
and arrest someone for whom there is cause to suspect that a restraining order has been violated.  
This could lead to absurd results; she or he may be in the middle of trying to arrest someone who 
is on a shooting spree.  Nonetheless, the State may wish to give those within its borders the right 
to have a court ordered protection order enforced.  Thus, it is reasonable that it choose language 
that is appropriate to the task given the conditions.  
The use of “[s]hall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order” along with 
“shall arrest… or seek a warrant,’”74 as found in the Colorado legislation, appears appropriate to 
this end.  The appropriateness of this language is bolstered by the fact that other states have used 
similar language in their statutes and courts have found these statutes to give rise to a right or 
entitlement to enforcement.  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, refers to four cases from four 
different states that have interpreted their mandatory arrest statutes to mean what they say, i.e. 
that an arrest is mandatory.75  The majority largely ignores these decisions and the statutes that 
74 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a), (b) (LEXIS through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).
75
 Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d. 137 (Or. 1983); Matthews v. Pickett, 996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1999); Campbell v. 
Campbell, 682 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Donaldson v. Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1992). The relevant parts of these decisions relied on, respectively:  OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3) (1977); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-3-611 (LEXIS through 2004 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-31 (LEXIS through the 211th Legis. 
2d Ann. Sess. (2005), through P.L. 2005 Ch. 114); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100 (LEXIS through 2004 Gen. 
Election (2005 c 2)). Oregon, in 1977, was the first state to enact mandatory arrest laws in domestic violence cases.  
Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 
63 (1992).  Note that Oregon’s mandatory arrest statute did not immediately result in more arrests by the police.  As 
is pointed out by both Ruth Gundle in Civil Liability for Police Failure to Arrest: Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 259, 262 (1986), and Sue Ellen Schuerman in Establishing a Tort Duty for Police Failure to Respond 
to Domestic Violence, 34 ARIZ. LAW. REV. 355 n.38, n.117, the arrest rates remained low (citing a 1979 study by the 
Oregon Governor's Commission for Women).  This prompted the litigation by the Oregon Coalition Against 
Domestic and Sexual Violence on behalf of Ms. Nearing in the hopes that a successful tort action would force 
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they are based on.  Justice Stevens mentions them and connects them together with the Colorado 
statute and a whole wave of statutes throughout the country that were enacted for the purpose of 
removing or limiting the discretion of the police to enforce protection or restraining orders.76
None of the statutes has “more mandatory” language; they all use the similar language of “shall 
arrest.”  A minority of states use the term “may,” and Colorado could have chosen this language 
had it wished enforcement to be discretionary.77
As these cases and legislation demonstrate, it was reasonable for Colorado to adopt the 
language that it did in order to make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.  In fact, 
Colorado had the advantage of both the existing Oregon legislation and case law interpreting the 
language to mean mandatory.  The majority does not point to a single case in which the courts 
have interpreted a statute purporting to mandate arrest for the violation of a restraining order as 
non-mandatory.
As a final point, the discretion that is allowed by these types of legislation is operational 
in nature.  It involves some amount of discretion as to how to carry out a function or policy.  As 
argued above, this is impossible to avoid.  However, this type of discretion is completely 
different from the type of discretion that is generally referred to in order to immunize the state or 
defeat claims to relief, namely the discretion to either set, ignore or change the underlying policy 
in question.78
compliance with the law.  Gundle, supra, at 262; Schuerman, supra, at n.117).  Schuerman also notes a similar 
problem in compliance following the enactment of legislation in Minnesota.  Schuerman, supra, at n.38. 
76 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See supra note 18. 
77
 For example, Montana legislation uses “may” and states that “arrest is the preferred response.”  MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-6-311 (LEXIS through all 2003 legislation.  No legislation enacted in 2004).
78
 Interpreting similar legislation to that in Colorado, the court held in Matthews v. Pickett, 996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 
1999), “The record supports a finding that the deputies' failure to arrest Winningham was a deviation from a policy 
as expressed by statutory mandate and was operational in nature.” Id. at 164.  It is common for immunity statutes to 
recognize this distinction, providing immunity for policy decisions, but not for implementation decisions.  See 57 
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal,County, School, and State Tort Liability § 78 (2001).  Section 78 of volume 57 n.1 states:
24
Thus, the generally accepted approach to issues of discretion, as well as the plain 
language, history and purpose of the legislation, all lead to the conclusion in Castle Rock that the 
police did not have the relevant discretion required to defeat an entitlement claim.  For the Court 
to find that the police did have that discretion is to effectively ignore the Colorado’s legislation 
and to find as a matter of constitutional law that the police have discretion to arbitrarily ignore 
restraining orders.
2) Rights versus procedure 
The Court makes a second set of arguments that even if the statute was mandatory it 
mandates one of two options, arrest or seek an arrest warrant, and since the second option is a 
procedure, and not an end in itself, this cannot give rise to an entitlement.79  This comes close to 
replicating the duty-discretion distinction above and is questionable on the merits, but even if the 
argument did have merit it misses the point. 
The mere fact that the police have an option does not mean that the police can choose to 
do nothing.  More importunately, under the Colorado statute, the choice between the two options 
is not discretionary, as the officer is only permitted to seek an arrest warrant if an arrest is 
impractical.80 There was no evidence of such impracticality in the Castle Rock case.  Thus, it is 
[i]n administering the test distinguishing between discretionary acts and ministerial functions, the 
key factor is the presence of basic policy formulation, planning or policy decisions, which are 
characterized by an exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion, because most 
states' laws provide for immunity if the government was acting in that manner at the time of the 
injury.
In fact the distinction goes as far back as Marbury v. Madison, in which Justice Marshall 
distinguished between cases in which an official has political or legal discretion as to what policy to follow 
or create, and those in which the law assigns a specific duty.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803).  In the 
former case it was held to be clear that the official could only be held accountable to the political process, 
while in the latter the Court held “…it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself 
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of this country for a remedy.  Id.
79 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2807-08.  As noted supra note 48, Justices Souter and Breyer, in their concurring 
opinion, rest on this argument.
80
 The option is an improvement on those statutes that merely make the arrest mandatory, for if the arrest is 
impractical it simply will not be done, mandatory language or not.  Those statutes that do not fill the gap by 
requiring that the officer seek an arrest warrant actually provide more discretion to the police officer to do nothing in 
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beside the point that the second option is no more than an entitlement to a procedure, which the 
Supreme Court has held is not enough for the attachment of a due process right.81  Even if it were 
held to be the case that the second option was merely a procedure, that point could only be 
reached if the Respondent succeeded on the merits as to the first requirement. This is highly 
questionable given the facts as alleged. It may be the case that the respondent would prevail on 
this issue, but that is question of fact which could only be reached by allowing this case to go to 
the merits stage.
3) Private right versus public purpose
The Court’s third set of arguments is that even if the statute mandated a non-discretionary 
duty on the part of the police, it would still not follow that the intention was to provide the 
plaintiff a right or entitlement, rather than simply fulfilling a public end, as does much of the 
criminal law.82  At first glance, the Court’s third set of arguments appears to be the most 
compelling.  We are very comfortable with the distinction between criminal law and civil law, 
with the former serving public ends and the latter serving private ends.83  As the majority states,
"serving of public rather than private ends is the normal course of the criminal law."84  Thus, it is 
the face of the impracticality of arrest.  Thus, it makes perfect sense to require that the officer seek a warrant as a 
means of enforcing the order under such circumstances.  It gives further clarity and direction to an officer who is to 
“use every reasonable means to enforce the order.”
81
 As the Court stated:
The problem with this is that the seeking of an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to nothing 
but procedure -- which we have held inadequate even to support standing, see Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); much less can it be the basis 
for a property interest. See post, at 3-4 (SOUTER, J., concurring).
Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2808 (notes omitted). I have argued that the duty to seek an arrest warrant is not a mere 
procedure in Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy. See supra note 18.
82 Id. at 2808-09.
83
 Justice Scalia reaches back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to support this view.  Id. at 2808 (citing 4 
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769) and Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 
(1892)).
84 Id.
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plausible to contend that a statute placing duties on the police to enforce the law are designed to 
serve public ends, rather than private ends.85
However, the two are not mutually exclusive.  There is no question that the Colorado 
statute was designed to serve public ends.  It does not follow, however, that it was not also 
designed to serve private ends, or even that it helped to serve the public end by giving a private 
entitlement.86  This is not general legislation calling on the police to carry out their functions 
generally, but is legislation designed to protect a particular class of vulnerable people.  The 
legislation sought to accomplish the goal by both shifting intervention in this area from 
mediation and counseling to arrests, and by making enforcement of restraining orders 
mandatory.87  The Colorado legislation came with a wave of similar legislation across the 
country that was the result of the victims and/or survivors and their advocacy groups pushing for 
these rights and duties.88  They even took part in the drafting, as G. Kristian Miccio points out:
In some jurisdictions, such as Colorado, advocates were approached by key 
legislators to incorporate mandatory state intervention into arrest provisions. This 
was the culmination of years of working within the law enforcement 
establishment as advocates attempted to change police practices through the 
institution of pro-arrest policies as the preferred course of action.89
85
 Although not recognized by Justice Scalia, his argument is superficially bolstered by Colorado Revised Statutes 
section 2-4-201(e) (Intentions in the enactment of statutes), which states “(1) In enacting a statute, it is presumed 
that:… (e) Public interest is favored over any private interest.” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS through 2004 
Supplement (2004 Sess.). This in no way defeats the private interest when it is compatable with the public interest.  
Further, “Where the meaning is clear and no injustice would result, the statute must be interpreted as written without 
resort to other rules of statutory construction.”  In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 29 (Colo. 1989) (citing People v. 
District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986)).
86
 Both our common law and statutory law regularly serve public ends by providing private rights of action.  
Punitive damages is the clearest common law example while the § 1983 legislation provides a right to sue for “the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
87 See Wanless, supra note 19.
88
 G. Kristian Miccio traces the histories of both the battered women’s movement, as well as the mandatory arrest 
movement, in A House Divided.  Supra note 18, at 248-64, 264-82 (2005). See also Wanless, supra note 19, at 539-
40.
89
 Miccio, supra note 18, at 279 (n.175 omitted) (referring to her interviews with advocates in Colorado in 2003).
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Finally, given that advocacy groups were involved in the drafting of the legislation, it is a stretch 
to think that the drafters of the legislation were not aware of the Oregon legislation and the 
Nearing case holding that its provisions did give rise to an entitlement to enforcement.90
4) Still not a property right?
Despite all of the considerations above, the majority of the Court still maintained that, 
even if this was an entitlement, it was not a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause because the Court did not believe it resembled traditional conceptions of 
property,91 it does not have monetary value and, according to the Court, “the alleged property 
interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new species of government benefit or service, 
but out of a function that government actors have always performed -- to wit, arresting people 
who they have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.”92
This last set of arguments is perhaps the least convincing of all.  Roth changed the focus 
from traditional wooden and naive notions of property to a view of property rights and 
entitlement that looked to the function of property.  By looking at the function of property from 
the past to the present, the Court was able to formulate the rule that, “It is a purpose of the 
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, 
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.”93  Entitlements to mandatory arrest for the 
violation of restraining orders are not novel; they have been around since 1977 – nearly thirty 
90
 The plaintiff in Nearing sued under the Oregon Tort Claims Act.  As the court held, “If a private defendant would 
be liable for harm caused by failure to carry out a mandatory duty for the benefit of a specific person protected by a 
court order,… the Tort Claims Act makes a public defendant liable in the same manner.”  Nearing, 670 P.2d at 144.  
As noted, this case was brought under § 1983 based on the alleged due process violation of the state entitlement.  It 
also may have been brought under Colorado state law; Colorado Revised Statutes section 24-10-118 allows for suits 
against public employees for injuries caused by willful and wanton conduct.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (LEXIS 
through 2004 Supplement (2004 Sess.)).  The facts alleged arguably satisfy the requirement.
91
 Scalia acknowledges that this is no bar to the claim.  Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
92 Id. (emphasis in original). 
93 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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years—and the Oregon statute was interpreted to create a new property-like entitlement in 1983, 
over twenty years ago.  
However, what has not been happening “all along” is police enforcement of restraining 
orders.  If the police had in fact been arresting people all along for these violations there would 
not have been a need for (what is now) a majority of the states in the U.S. to pass legislation 
mandating arrest for the violation of restraining orders.  It is precisely a “new species of 
government benefit or service” that was created by the legislation, rather than an incidental 
benefit gained by a general mandate of the police to enforce the law.  That benefit was further 
narrowed to the specific protected person named in the restraining order issued by the court.  As 
Justice Stevens states, “A concern for the "'protected person'" pervades the statute.”94
The assertion that a right to the mandatory enforcement of the restraining order had no 
monetary value is an odd claim in today’s world, where private security companies, private 
investigators, and bounty hunters routinely conduct police functions for money.95  The argument 
against Justice Steven’s claim that one could have a contract for such services furthers the point 
that the order had monetary value, rather than detracting from the point.  Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, responded in a note that:   
A private person would not have the power to arrest under those circumstances 
because the crime would not have occurred in his presence.  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-
3-201 (Lexis 1999).  And, needless to say, a private person would not have the 
power to obtain an arrest warrant.96
94 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2821 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95
 One wonders if Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority think that the protection given by the U.S. Marshals to 
members of the judiciary is without monetary value.  The U.S. Marshals website boasts that it “coordinated and 
provided 187 instances of personal protective services to U.S. Supreme Court justices” in 2004.  United States 
Marshals Service, Judicial and Court Security, at http://www.usmarshals.gov/judicial/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
96 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809 n.13.
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First, a private person would have had the power to arrest since the continued abduction of the 
children was a continuing breach of the terms of the restraining order.97  Secondly, it does not 
follow that there is no monetary value that can be placed on the enforcement of the order simply 
because a private person does not have the power to obtain an arrest warrant.  It means that the 
entitlement given is worth more than what one can buy in the market.  In the present case, it 
would not necessarily have been worth much more, since a citizen’s arrest could have been 
made.  In those cases in which a citizen’s arrest cannot be made, due to the fact that the violation 
of the order is not ongoing, the warrant is worth considerably more since it puts more resources 
towards fulfillment of the requirement and substantially increases protection and the likelihood 
of an arrest.   If these services were available in the market, one would pay more for them than 
what one can currently purchase from the private sector under the law. Thus, the Court’s 
conclusion here appears to be more of a value judgment about what rights one should be able to 
obtain rather than whether or not the state legislature created those rights.
D. Conclusions regarding Castle Rock
The Court ends its opinion by stating that: 
In light of today's decision and that in DeShaney, the benefit that a third party 
may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not 
trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in 
its "substantive" manifestations.  This result reflects our continuing reluctance to 
treat the Fourteenth Amendment as "'a font of tort law,'" but it does not mean 
States are powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies.  
Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, 17 Stat. 13 (the original source of § 1983), did not create a system by which 
police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that 
better policing might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such 
a system under state law.98
97
 The restraining order required that the husband not "molest or disturb" the peace of Ms. Gonzales and the 
children.  Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1144 (Appendix) (O'Brien, J., dissenting). 
98 Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (citations omitted). 
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This appears to say that states can only make state enforceable rights of this nature but 
not property rights or entitlements of this nature that are worthy of Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process protection.  This runs contrary to both the Fourteenth Amendment and the § 1983 
legislation.  It is irrelevant that the framers of these two provisions did not “create a system by 
which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better 
policing might have prevented.”99  They created a mechanism for holding accountable those 
acting under color of state authority for the deprivation of a right or privilege, namely, in this 
context, the right to simple due process.  The due process right attaches to the right or 
entitlement to property.  
At the beginning of its opinion the Court stated, “Such entitlements are "'of course, . . . 
not created by the Constitution.  Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.'"100
Thus, while the majority begins its judgment with the view that it is for states to determine the 
rights that are to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, by the end of the judgment it takes 
that determination into its own hands and decides that an entitlement to a mandatory arrest is not 
good enough to be counted as a property right and afforded Fourteenth Amendment protection.  
The Court has taken it upon itself to decide what the Fourteenth Amendment means by 
“property” by rewriting a statute designed to make enforcement of restraining orders mandatory 
for the health and welfare of “protected persons” holding those orders.  By writing in “may” to a 
statute that stated “shall,” the Court has chosen the liberty of police officers to arbitrarily ignore 
99 Id.
100 Id..at 2803 (citations omitted).
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their duties to enforce court ordered restraining orders over the safety and security of the victims 
of domestic violence. 
Rather than back up the decision of the Colorado General Assembly to foster the 
accountability of the police force and to protect some of the most vulnerable members of its 
society, the Supreme Court has undermined that accountability and protections it could have 
afforded. It has told these citizens that they do not deserve the even the most modest of all 
protections, the procedural due process protection against arbitrary governmental conduct.  
III. CARMICHELE
A.  Introduction
Since the beginning of South Africa’s constitutional dispensation there have been a 
number of cases in which the courts have drawn on the Constitution and its values to inform the 
development of the common law in order to hold the police accountable for safeguarding the 
people within its jurisdiction.101  These decisions are part of a shift in values from an 
101 Dersley v. Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit, 2000 1 ALL SA 484 (T) (Van Dyk, J.) (using the Police Service 
Act 68 of 1995 and the Constitution as factors in determining that the police owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care in 
a case involving the negligent misrepresentation by the police that a given car was not a stolen car vehicle, resulting 
in the plaintiff purchasing the vehicle and the police subsequently confiscating the vehicle from the plaintiff as 
stolen property); Van Duivenboden v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 4 All SA 127 (C) (Davis, J.) (holding that 
section 11(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 along with the Constitution placed a duty on the police to 
institute proceedings in terms of section 11(1) to have an assailant’s fire arm license revoked by the police 
Commissioner, the failure of which resulted in the assailant subsequently using the firearm to kill his wife and one 
child and to shoot and injure the plaintiff), aff’d, Minister of Safety & Sec. v. Van Duivenboden, 2002 (6) SA 431 
(SCA) (Nugent, J.) (providing a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the impact of the Constitution in cases where 
the state fails to act); Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety & Sec. (Women's Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae),
2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) (holding that the police did have a duty to protect the plaintiff from violent harm and that it 
violated that duty when it negligently allowed a violent sexual predator to escape from its custody resulting in the 
rape of the plaintiff at gun point (basing the duty on the constitutionally inspired legal convictions of the 
community; the right of freedom and security of the person entrenched in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, along 
with section 7(2) of the Constitution, which imposed a duty on the State to  “respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
Rights in the Bill of Rights;” the section 39(1)(b) provisions which imposed the duty on the State to recognize its 
obligation under international law to protect women against violent crime and against the gender discrimination 
inherent in violence against women, as well as section 205(3) of the Constitution and the Police Service Act 68 of 
1995 which made it clear that the functions of the police included the maintenance of law and order and the 
prevention of crime; and finally, the fact that there was no other practical and effective remedy available to the 
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authoritarian and racist legal system that did not generally attempt to justify its use of force and 
which was not generally held accountable for that use of force, to a system that fosters a culture 
of justification, public accountability and transparency.102  This section and the next address the 
last two sets of decisions referred to in note 101, namely, those involving Ms. Carmichele and 
Ms. N.K..
The Carmichele decisions are hard to compare with the Castle Rock decisions on the 
level of doctrine, since the two draw from very different constitutional mechanisms.  They are 
similar because in both cases the courts’ respective interpretations of their constitutions do have 
a direct impact on either the creation or extension of a remedy or the retraction of a remedy.  In 
both cases the underlying values or spirit of the constitutions either help forge a special 
victim of violent crime)), rev’g  Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2001 (4) SA 646 (T)) (Swart, J.) (holding 
that the Constitution was irrelevant to the question as to whether the police owed the plaintiff a legal duty when it 
negligently allowed a violent sexual predator to escape from its custody and who later raped the plaintiff at gun 
point); Geldenhuys v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2002 (4) SA 719 C (Davis, J.) (applying the Constitution to find a 
duty on the police to keep the plaintiff, who was in police custody when he sustained serious bodily injuries, safe 
from physical harm and finding that they failed in their duty by failing to timeously and properly investigate the 
nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries and to summon assistance); Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (applying the Constitution to find that a legal duty may have existed on the police and 
prosecutor and that they may have breached that duty when they recommended the release without bail of a Mr. 
Coetzee without placing before the magistrate any information regarding Coetzee’s previous convictions and history 
of sexual violence where Mr. Coetzee subsequently violently attacked the plaintiff), remanded to 2003 (2) SA 656 
(C) (Chetty, J.) (finding that the police and prosecution owed the plaintiff a legal duty and had failed in carrying out 
the duty); N. K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., CCT 52/04 (CC Jun. 13, 2005) (holding the State vicariously liable for 
the rape of a stranded women by three on duty uniformed police officers who offered to give her a ride home on the 
basis of the risk theory and the objective approach to vicarious liability along with the constitutional rights of the 
victim, the constitutional and statutory duties of the police, and the values of the South African Constitution), rev’g 
K. v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 2005 (3) SA 179 (SCA) (holding the State was not vicariously liable on the basis 
that the men were on a frolic of their own, based on the interest theory and subjective approach to vicarious liability 
and on the dubious exclusion of constitutional considerations).
102
 As Etien Mureinik states, the new dispensation is based on “…a culture of justification - a culture in which every 
exercise of power is expected to be justified.”  E. Mureinik, A Bridge to Where: Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994).  Mureinik draws from Ronald Dworkin’s notion that the overall 
point of law is to justify state coercion.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93, 109-10, 127, 190, 400 (1986).  
These ideals are found in the Final Constitution in section 1(d), and affirmed in section 41(1)(c), which provides, 
“All Spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must -- … provide effective, transparent 
accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.”  They are reiterated in Rail Commuters Action 
Group & Others v. Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail & Others, 2005 (2) SA 359 (CC); 2005 (4) BCLR 301, paras. 74-78 
(CC).  They were also used in Premier, Western Cape v. Faircape Prop. Developers (Pty) Ltd., 2002 (6) SA 180 (C) 
(Davis, J.) in order to provide a remedy for a property developer for damage caused by a negligent decision of one 
of the Premier’s ministers to grant an application to remove a title deed restriction on Faircape’s property.  The 
remedy was based in part on the notion of a culture of justification and the need to hold the government accountable 
to the people for harm caused by its negligence.
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relationship between victims and the police, thereby altering the existing distribution of 
entitlement and duties, or they hinder those attempts.  The one is set on transforming the 
relationship between the government and its people, by furthering a culture of justification and 
accountability, while the other is set on conserving the status quo.
In the case of Carmichele, the appellant, Ms. Carmichele, was the victim of a vicious 
attack by Mr. Coetzee in the small, secluded village of Noetzie.103  On the day in question, the 
Ms. Carmichele was visiting an acquaintance’s house in which she often stayed.104 Upon 
entering the house she was immediately attacked by Mr. Coetzee (he apparently had already 
broken in).105  He attacked her with a knife and a pick axe handle, breaking her arm.106  He 
dragged her around the house, threatening her, and ordered her to turn around (assumedly to 
strike her down from behind).107  When she refused he took out a knife and stabbed her in the 
breastbone, causing the knife to buckle.108  When he lunged at her again she managed to kick 
him and knock him off balance enough to escape through the door and out on to the beach where 
she found help.109  Mr. Coetzee was subsequently convicted of housebreaking and attempted 
murder.110
The crucial facts in the case revolved around the events that took place prior to that day 
and that allowed for those events to take place.  Mr. Coetzee had previously been convicted on 
charges of indecent assault and was currently standing trial on charges of raping a woman in the 
103 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at para 1.  See id. at paras 5-24 for a full account of the facts in the 
Constitutional Court judgment.
104 Id. at paras. 21, 23.
105 Id. at para. 23.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. 
110 Id. at para. 1.
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very town in which Ms. Carmichele’s attack took place.111  He was still in the grips of a 
suspended sentence on the first conviction and was subsequently convicted of attempted rape on 
the second.112
The central issue in the case revolved around the fact that, despite Mr. Coetzee’s history 
of sexual violence, the police and the prosecutor had recommended his release without bail and 
the prosecutor failed to place before the magistrate any information regarding his previous 
convictions.113  He was thus released on his own recognizance and the attack on Ms. Carmichele 
took place during this time.  This was in spite of several interested parties pleading with the 
prosecuting authorities to retain the perpetrator in custody pending the rape trial, including 
complaints related specifically to the safety of Ms. Carmichele.114
Ms. Carmichele brought her case in the High Court based on a wrongful omission by the 
police and prosecutor for failing to protect her from the attack.115  She relied on the obligations 
imposed on the police by the Interim Constitution116 and on the State under the constitutional 
rights to life, equality, dignity, freedom and security of the person and privacy.117  The High
Court dismissed the claim on the basis that she had failed to establish that the police or 
prosecutor had wrongfully failed to fulfill a legal duty owed specifically to her.118  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal similarly found “no special relationship” between the applicant and the 
police or prosecutor which could give rise to a duty to provide her the protection she required, 
111 Id. at paras. 8-9 
112 Id. at para. 24.
113 Id. at paras. 20, 63, 74.
114 Id. at paras. 15-17, 22.
115 Id. at para. 2.
116 Act 200 of 1993. 
117 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at para. 27.
118 Id. at paras. 2-3 (entering judgment at the end of the plaintiffs case); see also Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & 
Sec. & Another, Case No. 310/98, para. 5 (SCA 2000) [hereinafter Carmichele, SCA], available at: 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/files/310_98/310_98.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
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thus finding no grounds for imposing liability.119  The case went to the Constitutional Court as an 
application for special leave to appeal from the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the 
grounds that that court and the High Court failed to develop the common law in accordance with 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights as mandated by section 35(3) of the Interim
Constitution and section 39(2) of the Final Constitution.120
Before addressing the Constitutional Court’s decision in this case, it is important to point 
out exactly what the Court did and did not do.  The Court did:
1) rule that in all cases, the courts in South Africa must promote the spirit, purport, and 
objects of the Constitution when developing the common law;121
2) require that this take place, starting with the trial court, all the way up through the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and finally, if appropriate, the Constitutional Court;122
3) decide that this particular case was complex enough to warrant a full hearing to 
determine if a legal duty existed;123 and
4) give guidance as to why the claimant’s case may have merit given the Constitution.124
However, the Court did not decide the case on the merits and thus did not decide that a legal duty 
did in fact exist.  
B.  Courts must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution when 
developing the common law
The first point is important, for since the coming into effect of the Interim and Final 
Constitutions, the development of the common law of delict has generally been taking place 
119 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at paras 2-3.  The appeal was dismissed on exception by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.  Id. at para. 3.  See also Carmichele, SCA, Case No. 310/98 at paras. 20-21.
120 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at para. 28.
121
 Embodied in section 35 of the Interim Constitution and 39(2) of the Final Constitution.
122 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at paras. 50-55. 
123 Id. at paras. 80-81.
124 Id. at paras. 60-74.
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without any reference to section 35 of the Interim Constitution or section 39 of the Final 
Constitution.  Both advocates and judges have for the most part not applied their minds to these 
provisions.  It is quite likely that judges have refrained from doing so because advocates have not 
put such arguments before them.  The Constitutional Court recognized that to some extent 
lawyers may be to blame.125  No doubt, for a judge to apply his or her mind to a legal argument 
not before it cuts against the adversarial tradition of the common law.  In light of this tradition, a 
judge may think it inappropriate or at best discretionary.126
This is no longer the case.  In paragraph 39 of its judgment, the Constitutional Court 
stressed that the section 39(2) obligation is not discretionary, as it stated: “it is implicit in section 
39(2) read with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the 
section 39(2) objectives, the Courts are under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.”127
Section 39 places the duty on the courts to develop the common law in light of the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.  It thus places the duty on the courts to raise the issue should 
counsel not do so.128
C.  The process of developing the common law in light of the Constitution from the 
high court upwards is important
The second point is equally important, if not slightly controversial.  On one view, it might 
be thought that the Constitutional Court avoided providing desperately needed justice for the 
victim.  It might be argued that no court is better situated than the Constitutional Court, with its 
time, resources and expertise, to decide how to best develop the common law in line with the 
constitutional values.  Yet, the Constitutional Court resisted the temptation and referred the case 
125 Id. at paras. 40, 60.
126
 Note that Justice Scalia justified not certifying the question in Castle Rock to the Supreme Court of Colorado on 
the basis that the parties had not requested it.  See supra note 40.
127 Id. at para. 39.
128 Id.
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back to the High Court to attempt the difficult task.  The reasons for this are not wholly 
unpersuasive and revolved around: (1) a judgement about the expertise of the different courts, (2) 
fairness to potentially losing litigants, and (3) the most appropriate process for arriving at correct 
legal decisions.129  First, the Court argued both that the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal were better equipped for the task of developing the common law than the Constitutional 
Court.130  Secondly, it argued that fairness to a potentially losing litigant generally requires that a 
court not sit as court of first and last instance.131  Finally, and this point is directly related to the 
former, if the Constitutional Court decided the matter as a court of first and last instance, it 
would be denying itself the wisdom of the lower courts as well as the reconsideration and 
refinement of legal issues and arguments that take place when a case moves its way up to a court 
of last instance through the process of appeal.132
This contrasts with the U.S Supreme Court’s approach in Castle Rock, which overturned 
the circuit court’s decision to have the case heard on the merits.  If the Supreme Court would 
have upheld the circuit court’s decision, nothing guaranteed that Ms. Gonzales would have been 
successful, but the facts and case would have been more fully developed leading to a greater 
chance that a correct decision could have been reached in the case.  As noted above, the circuit 
court and the Supreme Court of Colorado were better placed than the U.S. Supreme Court to 
make the determination in this case.   
D. The case was complex enough to go to be heard on the merits
129
 These arguments sound remarkably similar to Justice Stevens’s arguments in Castle Rock for certifying the state 
law question to the Colorado Supreme Court and for deferring to the decision of the Tenth Circuit.  Castle Rock, 125 
S. Ct. at 2816 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2815-16. 
130 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at paras. 41, 50-60.
131 Id. at paras. 51,59.
132 Id. at paras. 50-52.
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The third point is important in this case, for without it the Court would have been 
required to uphold the decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal and would 
not have sent the case back down for reconsideration on the merits.  In other words, the Court 
needed to decide that the case was at least complex enough to warrant the view that the common 
law may be in need of development in this area for it to require that the High Court apply its 
collective mind to the issue. 
The grounds for holding that the there may be a prima facia case are based partly on point 
one above and the fact that the previous courts failed to add the constitutional values into the 
traditional mix of determining whether a legal duty existed.  This is not to say that the test for 
determining wrongfulness (legal duty) in delict is radically different from the balancing of 
factors and interests which has traditionally been apart of the test for determining if there is a 
legal duty, but as the Court states, “that exercise must now be carried out in accordance with the 
‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ and the relevant factors must be weighed in the 
context of a constitutional state founded on dignity, equality and freedom and in which 
government has positive duties to promote and uphold such values.”133  The point is both that 
this balancing should include consideration of such sections as those regarding the rights to life, 
dignity and freedom and security of the person,134 and that the South African constitutional 
provisions point towards a positive duty to prevent harm,135 thus distinguishing them from the 
American negative duty approach and putting them in line with the jurisprudence of the 
European Court and the European Convention on Human Rights.136
133 Id. at para. 43.
134 Id. at para. 44.
135 Id. at paras. 44-45.
136 Id. at paras. 45-48.
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Such positive duties with regards to the police can be found in both the Interim 
Constitution, the Final Constitution and in the Police Act.137  The Interim Constitution provides 
in section 215:
The powers and functions of the Service shall be -
(1) the prevention of crime; 
(2) the investigation of any offence or alleged offence; 
(3) the maintenance of law and order; and  
(4) the preservation of the internal security of the Republic.
The Final Constitution states in Section 7(2):
“The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights.”
Section 41 (1) (b) further provides that:
All spheres of government and all organs of State within each sphere must:
. . .
(2) secure the well-being of the people of the Republic;…
Section 198(a) provides that:
. . . National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a 
nation, . . . to be free from fear
And, section 205(3) reads:
The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to 
maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and 
their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.
The duties of the South African Police Service are detailed in the South African Police Service 
Act 68 of 1995. 64 Section 5 reads:
The functions of the South African Police shall be, inter alia -
(1) the preservation of the internal security of the Republic; 
(2) the maintenance of law and order; 
(3) the investigation of any offence or alleged offence; and
(4) the prevention of crime.
Notice, that while there is mandatory language here, there is nothing as specific as the 
Colorado legislation, which identifies specific duties to a specific class of persons.  Nonetheless, 
137 Id. at para. 62.
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according to the Court, these duties are accentuated in the case of women, both because of the 
historically vulnerable place of women within South African society,138 and because of South 
Africa’s international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women.139 Added to these considerations are the facts of the case 
relating to the actions of police officer Klein in recommending to the prosecutor that Coetzee be 
released on warning, as well as failing to provide the prosecutor with all the relevant information 
that might establish a case against bail.140  When it came to the potential liability of prosecutors, 
the Court noted an absence of any duty explicitly laid in the Interim Constitution.  Rather it noted 
a general duty on prosecutors to be found in the common law.141  That duty included putting any 
information that was relevant to the decision whether to grant or not to grant bail before the 
Court.  The Court further quoted the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors to the 
effect that:
In the performance of their duties, prosecutors shall:
(a) . . . 
(b) Protect the public interest, act with objectivity, take proper account of the 
position of the suspect and the victim and pay attention to all relevant 
circumstances, irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage 
of the suspect; . . . .142
The Court then went on to note:
138 Id. 
139 See id. at n.67.  The Castle Rock majority opinion by Justice Scalia does not so much as mention, much less 
respond to, the argument of the amicus brief of International Law Scholars and Women’s, Civil Rights and Human 
Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents that both the customary international law norms to 
provide protection and remedies for domestic violence and the obligations of the United States as a party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights should inform the Court’s consideration of the due process 
question.  Brief of International Law Scholars and Women's, Civil Rights and Human Rights
Organizations As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1-2, 6-21, 21-29, Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 
2796 (2005) (No. 04-278). 
140 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at paras. 63-71.
141 Id. at para. 72.
142 Id. at para. 74.
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That said, each case must ultimately depend on its own facts.  There seems to be 
no reason in principle why a prosecutor who has reliable information, for 
example, that an accused person is violent, has a grudge against the complainant 
and has threatened to do violence to her if released on bail should not be held 
liable for the consequences of a negligent failure to bring such information to the 
attention of the Court. 143
The final stumbling block to the claim was one of causation.  The Respondent argued that 
based on the magistrates testimony he would not have held Coetzee in custody even if all the 
relevant information was put before him.144  According to the analysis of the Court in paragraphs 
75-77, this was not at all clear.  It may well have been that the magistrate would not have 
released Coetzee on bail had all of the relevant evidence been brought before him.145
The Court concluded that in cases where the facts are complex and the legal position is 
uncertain it would be better for trial courts not to dismiss cases on exception.146  The reasons for 
restraint included making decisions based on a developed record rather than hypothetical facts, 
which may lead to more certain and final decisions at both the trial court level and appellate level 
should they make it up on appeal, which in turn may curtail rather than prolong litigation.147  In 
the end, the Court was “… satisfied that the case for the appellant ha[d] sufficient merit to 
require careful consideration to be given to the complex legal issues that it raise[d].” 148
E. Guidance as to why the claimant’s case may have merit given the Constitution.
143 Id. 
144 Id. at para. 75.
145 Id. at paras. 75-77.
146 Id. at para. 80.  This again contrasts with the Castle Rock decision.
147 Id. at paras. 80-81.
148 Id. at para. 81.
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The guidance given by the Court falls short of dictating a final decision in the case.  
There was much that still required findings on the facts and a delicate balancing of the interests 
involved.  Some of the assistance given has been noted above in terms of the various possible 
legal sources for finding a legal duty both within and outside the Interim Constitution and the 
Final Constitution.  The Court did attempt to put to rest fears that such decisions may unduly 
fetter the discretion of public authorities in the carrying out of their duties.  This is to be 
accomplished by a proper application of the balancing of interests inquiry and a concomitant 
inquiry into the elements of foreseeability, or reasonableness and proximity or remoteness,149
with due consideration to pressures put upon prosecutors and police in carrying out their 
duties.150
In giving guidance, the Court noted that it is unclear how the outlined constitutional 
duties on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right in the Bill of Rights 
(particularly with regard to women) are to be translated into private law duties.151  In any case, 
the traditional mechanisms for determining when justice and public policy required the 
development of the common law “…might well have to be replaced, or supplemented and 
enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied in the 
Constitution.”152
While acknowledging that there must be many ways to use section 39(2) in this area of 
delict,153 the Court did suggest the following concrete possibility:
a) to accentuate the objective nature of unlawfulness as one of the elements 
of delictual liability, particularly in the context of a bail hearing where the 
149 Id. at paras. 49, 57.
150 Id. at para. 73.
151 Id. at para. 57.
152 Id. at para. 56 (footnotes omitted).
153 Id. at para. 58.
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roles and general duties of investigating officers and prosecutors are more 
clearly defined than would normally be the case;
b) to define it more broadly; and
c) to allow the elements of fault and remoteness of damage to play the 
greater role in limiting liability.154
F.  After Remand
When the case came back down to Justice Chetty on remand in Carmichele v. Minister of 
Safety & Security,155 it was up to him to decide if the omissions by the police and prosecutor 
were wrongful in light of section 39(2) of the Final Constitution and, if so, whether the wrongful 
and negligent omission was both the factual and legal cause of the harm to the plaintiff. 
Mr. Trengrove, advocate for the plaintiff, argued that the police and prosecutors had 
failed to act to prevent the attack on Ms. Carmichele on no less than three separate occasions: (1) 
in March, after Coetzee’s arrest for the rape and attempted murder, when it was known by the 
police and prosecution that he had had a previous conviction for a sexual offence; 156 (2) in April, 
after the prosecutor had interviewed Coetzee, after his attempted suicide, and after his return 
from a psychiatric evaluation in which it was determined that he was fit to stand trial and that he 
had the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts;157 and (3) in June, after the owner of 
the house in which the attack on Ms. Carmichele took place had reported that Coetzee had been 
snooping around her house and had attempted to break in.158
During the course of the trial, the primary police investigator, Klein, was found to have 
fabricated a set of false justifications for his failure to oppose the release of Coetzee after his 
154 Id. at para. 57.
155
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156 Id. at para. 7.
157 Id. at para. 24.
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arrest for rape and attempted murder of a Ms. Eurona in March.159  Unfortunately, both Klein’s 
supervisor, Hugo, and the prosecutor, Louw, simply acquiesced in his decision not to oppose 
bail, because of their esteem for Klein (or so they claimed).160  What was important was that both 
Hugo and Louw conceded under cross examination that had they applied their minds, they would 
not have acquiesced in Klein’s decision.161  Louw also conceded that she was in error in agreeing 
to his release in April after his psychiatric exam,162 and in not assuring that he was arrested after 
the trespass and attempted break-in in June. 163
Counsel for the State attempted to argue that it was questionable whether propensity to 
commit a crime was a relevant factor in opposing bail or whether the main consideration was if 
the accused would appear for his trial.164  There was also an attempt to argue that the provisions 
of the Interim Constitution that provided that an accused had a right to bail “unless the interest of 
justice determined otherwise” made it reasonable for the police and prosecution to err on the side 
of bail or freedom.165
Justice Chetty did not accept either argument, as it was clear to him that it must have 
been apparent to the police and prosecution that Coetzee either could not or would not control his 
sexual aggression,166 and that even if it was generally safe to err on the side of freedom, given 
the facts of this case, they should have opposed bail.167  In fact, both Louw and Hugo conceded 
159 Id. at para. 16.
160 Id. at paras. 11, 12, 19.
161 Id. at paras. 23, 26.
162 Id. at para. 24.
163 Id. at para. 25.
164 Id. at para. 21.
165 Id. at para. 22.
166 Id. at para. 21.
167 Id. at para. 22.
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that their decisions not to oppose bail were inconsistent with the guidelines circulated by the 
Attorney General and the South African Police Service under the Interim Constitution.168
Justice Chetty maintained that under the pre-constitutional common law there would have 
been no legal duty on the police or the prosecutor vis-a-vis the plaintiff.169  Although it was not 
said, presumably this would have been so because the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendants was not sufficiently “special” for there to be a legal duty towards her (as was held in 
the case before the Supreme Court of Appeal).  As questionable as this may be, both in terms of 
the legal requirement and the satisfaction of the legal requirement given the above facts, the 
introduction of the Constitution changed the legal analysis.
Turning to the inquiry under section 39(2) of the Final Constitution, Justice Chetty 
followed the Constitutional Court’s two stage analysis, first determining if the common law was 
in need of development under section 39(2), and, if it was in need of development, then 
determining how to make that development.170  Counsel’s arguments that there was no need for 
the development given the amendments to the bail provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977 were not taken very seriously by the Court.171  As Justice Chetty stated, “the question 
that arises for decision is whether, at the time the plaintiff suffered her loss, the relevant 
authorities discharged their constitutional duty.”172
Justice Chetty found the constitutional duty “enshrined in sections 10, 11 and 12 of the 
Constitution, which entrench the right to dignity, life, and freedom and the security of all 
168 Id. at para. 26.
169 Id. at para. 27.
170 Id. at para. 28.
171 Id. at para. 29.
172 Id.
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person,”173 along with section 7(2) which imposes a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill the rights in the Constitution.174
Justice Chetty followed the Constitutional Court’s guidance in noting that it is the police 
and prosecutor who are the primary agencies for protecting not only the public in general, but 
women in particular, against violent crime.175  Following the Constitutional Court’s dicta, Justice 
Chetty held: 
that prosecutors are obliged, in the performance of their duties, to 'protect the 
public interest, act with objectivity, take proper account of the position of the 
suspect and the victim and pay attention to all relevant circumstances irrespective 
of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect’  ….[and that 
in the context of a bail hearing, they have a duty] “to place before the court any 
information relevant to the exercise of the discretion with regard to the granting or 
refusal of bail, and, if granted, any appropriate conditions attaching thereto. 176
With this in mind, and following the submission by Mr. Trengrove for the plaintiff, Justice 
Chetty revisited the conventional test for wrongfulness and held that “[r]easonableness, on which 
the legal convictions of the community are based, is now to be found in the Constitution and not 
in some vague notion of public sentiment or opinion.”177  He then went on to quote supportive 
language from the decision of Justice Davis in Van Duivenboden v. Minister of Safety & 
Security178 to the effect that the Constitution and South African society are founded on the values 
of dignity, liberty and equality and “the added principle that public authority must be transparent 
and accountable to the public it serves.”179
On the issue of wrongfulness, the Court concluded that “the enquiry whether the State 
owed the public in general, and women in particular, a duty at private law to exercise reasonable 
173 Id. at para. 30.
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at para. 31.
178 2001 4 B All SA 127 (C).
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 2003 (2) SA 656 (C) at para. 31 (quoting Van Duivenboden, 2001 4 B All SA 127 at 132d).
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care in the prevention of violent crime, the proper application of the test requires one to attach 
primary significance to these constitutional imperatives.”180  Given the above facts, the 
imperatives noted above, and the lack of a public law remedy, the Court held that Klein, Hugo 
and Louw owed the plaintiff a delictually cognizable legal duty to protect her against the risk of 
sexual violence perpetrated by Coetzee.181
In response to worries of the opening of the floodgates of litigation, Justice Chetty was 
careful to limit his decision to the facts of this case, noting that the standard is simply to act with 
the care and diligence of the ordinary police person and prosecutor.182  There was little question 
as to their negligent failure to live up to the duties imposed given the facts of the case.  However, 
there still remained the question of whether their failure was the factual and legal cause of the 
harm done to the plaintiff.
It is worth noting that Justice Chetty made no reference to the factor of a “special 
relationship” between the plaintiff and the defendants, a factor that was elevated to the level of a 
requirement by the Supreme Court of Appeal in its decision.  Although he mentioned the duty of 
the police and prosecutor to women “in particular,”183 his decision does not seem to rest on the 
special vulnerability of women in South African society, nor on any special duty to protect 
women under South Africa’s international obligations.  Thus, his decision may be broader than 
the obiter dicta of the Constitutional Court, which put considerable emphasis on the vulnerable 
position of women in South Africa, their continued subordination through sexual violence, and 
on South Africa’s international duties under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
180 Id. at para. 32.
181 Id. 
182 Id.
183 Id. 
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Discrimination Against Women to prevent the violation of women’s rights and their 
subordination.184
It is worth noting that one may argue that under the Final Constitution no “special 
relationship” is required, or that the Constitution itself embodies the “special relationship” that is 
required.  That special relationship is embodied in the new covenant between the whole of the 
population of South Africa and its government, as well as between each other.  It may be argued 
that the constitutional regime is based on a new and different kind of society -- one that no longer 
accepts a mere minimal laissez faire state where, at best, one has negative rights to be left to 
one’s own devices, but rather, one in which the people can legitimately expect more from each 
other and more from the state by way of positive duties.185
On the issue of causation, Justice Chetty noted that there are two components to 
causation, factual and legal.186  There would be little difficulty showing factual causation based 
on an objective approach to what a reasonable magistrate would have done if Klien, Hugo and 
Louw performed their duties.187  Although Justice Chetty noted the broad based policy inquiry 
for legal causation in South Africa,188 he did not conduct the inquiry, but simply stated that he 
was “…satisfied that there was a sufficiently close nexus between the omissions and the harm 
occasioned to the plaintiff.”189  If this lacuna was an error, the error was harmless, for the policy 
184 Carmichele, CC, 2001 (4) SA 938 at para. 62.
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analysis would simply be a repetition of the analysis that he conducted when determining the 
issue of wrongfulness/ legal duty above.
I.V. N.K.
One of the many tragedies of apartheid was not merely a breakdown in the rule of law but 
the breakdown of confidence in those enforcing the law. The injustices of apartheid law were 
often amplified by enforcement that was arbitrary, cruel and corrupt with little regard for human 
rights or due process.190 At the end of Apartheid, there was an extreme lack of confidence in the 
police. As Mark Malan notes, “Obviously, the majority population did not hold the SAP or its 
offshoots in high regard. In fact, by the time that the political transition to democracy began in 
1990, the SAP had become ‘...an inefficient and ineffective police force, which had lost the 
confidence of the South African public.’”191
One would have hoped that with the end of apartheid, and the beginning of the ‘new 
South Africa’ that the police services would rise to the call to serve and protect. Unfortunately, 
as the facts of the NK case illustrate, all too often, they have not.192 The essential facts of the 
case are simple, yet disheartening. The applicant in the case was stranded in the early hours of 
the morning and was in need of a ride home.193 The applicant accepted a ride from three 
uniformed on duty police officers who, instead of assisting her and protecting her, raped her and 
190
 Janine Rauch, Police Reform and South Africa’s Transition, at 1, available at 
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beat her before throwing her into some bushes close to her home.194 The three officers were 
convicted and given life sentences for the rape and 10 year sentences for the kidnapping.195 Ms. 
N K originally brought her claim against all three assailants as well as the Minister of Safety and 
Security but decided to abandon the claim against the three assailants.196 Both the High Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal had dismissed the case on the grounds that the respondent was 
not vicariously liable for the actions of the police officers.197 These decisions were unanimously 
overruled by the Constitutional Court in an opinion handed down by O’Regan J in N K v 
Minister of Safety and Security.
The constitutionally inspired approach to vicarious liability by Justice O’Regan in N.K. v. 
Minister of Safety & Security has resulted in the adoption of the risk theory of vicarious liability 
over the traditional interest theory of vicarious liability.  The courts in South Africa have gone 
back and forth between a narrow or conservative view of “scope of employment” and a broad or 
liberal view of “scope of employment” in frolic cases.198  The narrow view is often associated 
with the interest theory, which limits the liability of an employer for the conduct of its employees 
to that which further the interests of the employer.  This is the more libertarian view; and from 
this view, vicarious liability is an exception to the general rule that one is to look out for her or 
him self and no one else.  The Supreme Court of Appeal in K. v. Minister of Safety & Security
briefly captured the policy considerations behind the rule as:
…serving to maintain a balance between imputing liability without fault (which 
runs counter to general legal principles) and the need to make amends to an 
injured person who might otherwise not be recompensed.  From the innocent 
194 Id. at paras. 1-6.
195 Id. at para. 6.
196 Id. at para. 8.
197 Id. at paras. 1, 8 and 9.
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employer’s point of view, the greater the deviation the less justification there can 
be for holding him or her liable.199
Employers, be they private or public, are not their brothers’ keepers and the only way to justify 
holding them accountable for the actions of their brothers or sisters is if their brother or sister is 
going about his or her employer’s business and furthering her, his, or its interests.200  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal adopted this view when it held that the State was not vicariously liable 
for the rape of the plaintiff. 
In contrast, the worldview that underlies the risk theory of vicarious liability sees the 
person as a cooperating member of the community, who not only competes for whatever she or 
he can take from the community, but who is nurtured by that community and who has duties to 
the members of that community.  Those duties include being responsible for the dangers and 
risks that they impose on the community and paying for the harm that is caused by the increased 
risks that they impose.201
In her opinion, Justice O’Regan drew heavily from the Court in Carmichele for a number 
of constitutional values that are relevant to the present case.202  Those values are in part found in 
provisions of the Constitution and The South African Police Service Act, which not only give 
women like Ms. N.K. rights, but also impose duties on the State.  These rights and duties include 
the rights to security of the person, dignity, privacy and substantive equality, as well as the duties 
199
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found in section 205 of the Constitution and the Preamble of The South African Police Service 
Act.203  Justice O’Regan, quoting Carmichele at length, emphasized the importance of being free 
from sexual violence as a prerequisite for equality and self determination, and of the 
responsibilities of the police to protect women from such violence.204  She identified the policy 
reasons for the rule as affording claimants efficacious remedies, inciting employers to take active 
steps to prevent their employees from causing harm to the public, as well as holding employers 
liable only when it is fair to do so.205
There are other reasons for vicarious liability not mentioned by Justice O’Regan, 
including the balancing of equities between a victim and an employer who:
1.  either generally or specifically profits from the deeds of her or his employees,206 and/ 
or
2.  who creates greater risks to the public through her or his employees,207
3.  who provides the opportunity and/or tools to her or his employees who cause 
203 Id. at para. 18. 
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reason why the different reasons cannot be combined.  See Minister of Police v. Rabie, which comes close to 
elevating the risk theory to the rule in the case and thereby supplanting the need for a ‘within the scope of one’s duty 
test.’  1986 1 SA 117 (AD) at 134-35.  But see Minister of Law & Order v. Ngobo, 1992 (4) SA 822 (A) (clarifiying 
that the risk justification for the rule is not the same as the rule); see also Ess Kay Electronics Pte Ltd. & Another v. 
First Bank of S. Afr. Ltd., 2001 (1) SA 1214, para. 10 (SCA) (refusing to follow the Rabie test, arguing that “what 
seems to require continual emphasis, therefore, is that the rule and the reason for its existence must not be confused. 
The risk referred to, and considerations of public policy, have to do with the reason for the rule. They are not 
elements of the rule and they do not inform its content.”).  However, it does not follow that the above two-part test 
set out in Rabie was incorrect.  See N.K., CCT 52/04 at para. 31 n.39.  It further does not follow that the reasons for 
the rule ‘do not inform its content.’  The Court put it so: 
what seems to require continual emphasis, therefore, is that the rule and the reason for its existence 
must not be confused. The risk referred to, and considerations of public policy, have to do with the 
reason for the rule. They are not elements of the rule and they do not inform its content. 
Ess Kay, 2001 (1) SA 1214 at para. 10.  “If risk to the public is one of the underlying rationales for imposing 
vicarious liability then it follows that, all things being equal, the more risk an employer places on the public the 
more reason for imposing liability.  Even the Court in Ngobo recognized it as one of the factors to be taken into 
consideration (Ngobo at 828-834).”  Christopher J. Roederer, Law of Delict, in 2001 ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 348.
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harm,208 and 
4.  who is in a better place to not only bear and spread the cost of the harm,209
5.  but who also is in a better place to deter the harmful conduct that takes place.210
These are the typical justifications found in common law jurisdictions and they combine notions 
of corrective justice, economic efficiency, and deterrence to outweigh the ‘normal rule’ that one 
is not responsible for the delicts or torts of others, but only responsible for her or his own delicts 
or torts.  Further justifications or principles that might justify the imposition of vicarious liability 
in the context of post-apartheid South Africa include such ideals as public accountability,211 non-
delegable duties,212 human rights, ubuntu,213 and the overall transformation of South African law 
and society from one that is founded on the laissez  faire values of freedom and autonomy to one 
208
 This is a subcategory of the risk theory.  For the view under U.S. law see, e.g. Restatement Second of Agency § 
219(2)(d); DOBBS, supra note 24, at 910, 914 (referring to the case of Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46 
(1st Cir. 1998) (holding the owners of an inn vicariously liable for the rape of a tenant by its employee based on the 
view that the employment made the tort possible and/or aided in the accomplishment of the tort)). 
209 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 LEGAL STUD. 447, 461 (1985). 
210 See, e.g, Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).  This principle is 
broader than “control,” particularly when an employer has a range of devises available to her to deter harmful 
conduct, including, training, supervision and other mechanisms or procedures to encourage safety and to curb 
harmful conduct.  The point is that an employer is often better placed than the employee him or her self to deter or 
limit harmful conduct.  Sykes’s and Richard Epstein’s work combine points four and five above with arguments 
about the cost of identifying and suing employee plaintiffs, cheaper insurance under vicarious liability and overall 
security against harm.  RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS 240-41 (1999).     
211
 Justice O’Regan discusses this value in the context of identifying the issue as a legal issue rather than merely a 
factual issue but does not address it in the context of the holding the State vicariously liable.  In critiquing Mkhatswa 
v. Minister of Defence, 2000 (1) SA 1104 (SCA) (where the Court found the State was not vicariously liable for the 
actions of its employees when one of its employees left the base with an unauthorized vehicle and an indeterminate 
number of rifles that were in the possession and control of on duty sentries in order to exact revenge on innocent 
victims), this author argued that the decision “[could] not be in keeping with any notion of government 
accountability. …This would provide little incentive for the Minister to impose discipline in the ranks, thus leading 
to less and less accountability. This cannot be in keeping with the spirit of the Bills of Rights.”  Christopher J. 
Roederer, Law of Delict, in 2000 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW.
212 For U.S. authority, see Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ct, 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989).
213
 As Marius Pieterse writes, “The Nguni word ubuntu represents notions of universal human interdependence, 
solidarity and communalism which can be traced to small-scale communities in pre-colonial Africa, and which 
underlie virtually every indigenous African culture.” M. Pieterse, “Traditional” African Jurisprudence, in
JURISPRUDENCE 441 (Christopher J. Roederer & D. Moellndorf eds.,2004).Justice O’Regan draws on the fact that 
vicarious liability is a common feature of traditional society in South Africa.  She notes that the Kraalhead is liable 
for all the delictual acts of inhabitants of the Kraal.  N.K., CCT 52/04 at para. 24 n.30.
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founded on equality, dignity, freedom, mutual respect, and caring cooperation in the achievement 
of self determination for all South Africans.214
In conclusion, Justice O’Regan held that the opportunity to commit the crime arose because 
of the trust put in the policemen, a trust that was constitutionally mandated, and the breach of 
that trust constituted a breach of their duties and an infringement of her rights to dignity and 
security of the person.215  The delict was held to be intimately connected with the purpose of the 
employer rendering the State vicariously liable.216
V. CONCLUSION
As noted above, the South African approach to these cases is hard to compare to the Castle Rock
cases, or at least to the U.S. Supreme Court decision.  They appear a world apart.  For one, the 
status quo baseline is the neutral, natural distribution of entitlements.217 While for the other, the 
status quo was a hold over from the authoritarian apartheid regime, which was racist, sexist and 
often unaccountable for what it did.  While the one court struggles to hold back change, the other 
struggles towards change.  As the late Justice Mahomed stated in S. v. Makwanyane, “The South 
African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a 
214
 See section 1 of the Final Constitution as well as Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative 
Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998); S. Woolman & D. Davis, The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De 
Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application of Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and 
Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 36 (1996); H. Corder, Prisoner, Partisan and Patriarch: 
Transforming the Law in South Africa 1985-2000, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 772 (2001); A. Chaskalson, The Third Bram 
Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order,16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193 
(2000); D. Moseneke, The Fourth Bram Fischer Lecture: Transformative Adjudication, 18 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS 309 
(2002); Christopher J. Roederer, Post-matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the Rule of Values in South 
African Law, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 57 (2003).  Respect for the rule of law is fostered by holding the guardians 
of the law responsible for the violations of the law by their employees.   N.K., CCT 52/04 at para. 52.
215 N.K., CCT 52/04 at para. 57.
216 Id.
217
 As Cass Sunstein states, “…the status quo—what people currently have—is often treated as the neutral and just 
foundation for decision. Departures from the status quo signal partisanship; respect for the status quo signals 
neutrality. When the status quo is neither neutral nor just, reasoning of this kind produces injustice” CASS SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION v (1993).
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decisive break from and ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, 
authoritarian, insular and repressive.”218
The legislature in Colorado attempted to apply this standard when drafting the legislation 
addressed in Castle Rock by rejecting the history of violence against women and children, and 
rejecting the history of police indifference to their plight.  It attempted a decisive break with that 
past in order to provide victims an entitlement and to hold the police accountable.  While the 
Court would never come out and endorse this past, which Colorado attempted to reject,219 it has 
at least in part, forced the people of  Colorado to retain and live with that part of its past. It has 
denied them the most basic of all protections afforded to those living within the borders of this 
country, the right of procedural due process. 
218 1995 (3) SA 39, para. 262 (CC).
219
 Remember that Justice Scalia opens his opinion by recounting how horrible the facts are.  125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802. 
Justice Scott for the Supreme Court of Appeal in K. also had sympathy for the plaintiff that he and his court denied 
relief, as he stated, “I have the deepest sympathy for the appellant, as I do for the thousands of women who are raped 
every year in this country. Ideally, they should all receive compensation, but that is something for the Legislature 
and beyond the jurisdiction of this court.” K., 2005 (3) SA 179, para. 10 (SCA).
